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POLYNOMIAL GRAPHS WITH APPLICATIONS
TO GRAPHICAL GAMES, EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES,
AND GAMES WITH EMERGENT NODE TREE STRUCTURES
RUCHIRA S. DATTA
Abstract. We prove a theorem computing the number of solutions to a sys-
tem of equations which is generic subject to the sparsity conditions embodied
in a graph. We apply this theorem to games obeying graphical models and
to extensive-form games. We define emergent-node tree structures as addi-
tional structures which normal form games may have. We apply our theorem
to games having such structures. We briefly discuss how emergent node tree
structures relate to cooperative games.
The set of Nash equilibria for a game with generic payoff functions is finite [2].
This implies that the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria for a game with generic
payoff functions is also finite. These are the real solutions to a system of polynomial
equations and inequalities. The complex solutions to the system of equations are
called quasiequilibria. Thus, the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria is a subset
of the set of quasiequilibria. In fact, the set of quasiequilibria is also finite in the
most generic case, and its cardinality can be computed as a function of the numbers
of pure strategies of the players. Thus, this is an upper bound on the number of
totally mixed Nash equilibria. Even in a nongeneric case, as long as the set of
quasiequilibria is finite, its cardinality will be bounded above by the number in the
generic case.
For the main theorem of this article, Theorem 1, we hypothesize a set of technical
conditions that a system of polynomial equations may satisfy, which are encoded in
an associated graph, the polynomial graph, and we prove a formula describing the
number of solutions in this case. We then show how to associate such a graph to
three special classes of games. The first two are graphical games and extensive-form
games. The last is games with emergent node tree structure, a new model for games
in which the players can be hierarchically decomposed into groups. Usually such
hierarchical decomposition is modelled by cooperative games, and we briefly discuss
how our model is related to, yet differs from, the cooperative framework.
1. Generic Number of Roots of a Sparse Polynomial System
The following theorem tells us the number of 0-dimensional complex roots (none
of whose components are zero) of a system of polynomial equations which obeys
certain sparsity conditions and is otherwise generic. Our formulation of this theo-
rem is motivated by the applications to game theory which follow, although such
polynomial systems may arise in other contexts.
Date: September 25, 2018.
Key words and phrases. Nash equilibrium, Bernstein number, normal form game, graphical
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Theorem 1. Suppose that 0 < d ∈ N and that we are given a partition {1, . . . , d} =∐N
i=1 Ti of {1, . . . , d}. Write di = |Ti|. Suppose further that we are given a directed
graph G, the polynomial graph, on d vertices, denoted v1, . . . , vd, without self-loops
and with the property that for any vj and Ti, if there is some k ∈ Ti such that there
is an edge from vj to vk in G, then for every k ∈ Ti there is an edge from vj to vk
in G. Let
f1(σ1, . . . , σd) = 0,
f2(σ1, . . . , σd) = 0,
...
fd(σ1, . . . , σd) = 0
be a system (1) of d polynomial equations in d variables σ1, . . . , σd with the following
properties:
(1) All monomials occuring in the fi’s are squarefree.
(2) If σj , σk ∈ Ti with j 6= k then σj and σk do not both occur in any monomial
of any of the fi’s.
(3) If there is no edge from vj to vk in G then the variable σk does not occur
in fj.
Thus, the equations are multilinear, and they are linear over the variables from each
Ti. Construct a d× d matrix M as follows: If variable σk occurs in the polynomial
fj, with Ti the subset containing vk, then
Mjk =
1
(di!)1/di
,
otherwise Mjk = 0. If the system (1) is 0-dimensional, then the number of its solu-
tions in (C∗)d (i.e. such that σk 6= 0 for all k) is bounded above by the permanent
of M , and is equal to the permanent of M for generic coefficients.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume
Ti =
{
1 +
i−1∑
l=1
dl, 2 +
i−1∑
l=1
dl, . . . , di +
i−1∑
l=1
dl
}
,
that is, that the Ti’s are contiguous.
Let aij = 1 if there is an edge in G from vj to vk for k ∈ Ti, and aij = 0 otherwise.
Then the Newton polytope Pj of fj is the Cartesian product P1j ×P2j × · · ·×PNj,
where Pij is the convex hull of the scaled coordinate vectors {aijek | k ∈ Ti} and
the origin. For i with aij = 1, Pij is the di-dimensional unit simplex, and for i
with aij = 0, Pij degenerates to the di-dimensional origin (which is a 0-dimensional
simplex). By the Bernstein-Kouchnirenko Theorem [1] [4], it suffices to show that
the mixed volume of the polytopes P1, . . . , Pd is given by the permanent of M .
Let Qj = λ1P1 + · · · + λjPj , where + denotes Minkowski addition and the
scale factors λ1, . . . , λj are parameters. We show by induction on j that Qj =
Q1j ×Q2j × · · · ×QNj , where Qij is the convex hull of
{(ai1λ1 + ai2λ2 + · · ·+ aijλj)ek | k ∈ Ti}
and the origin. (If ai1λ1 + ai2λ2 + · · · + aijλj = 0 then Qij degenerates to the
origin.) The base case follows from our characterization of Pj above. Now consider
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the Minkowski sum of Qj = Q1j × · · ·×QNj and λj+1Pj+1 = (λj+1P1(j+1))× · · · ×
(λj+1PN(j+1)). It follows from the definition of Minkowski sum that this is (Q1j +
λj+1P1(j+1)) × · · · × (QNj + λj+1PN(j+1)), and (using the induction hypothesis)
that each factor Qij + λj+1Pi(j+1) is equal to the convex hull of{
(ai1λ1 + ai2λ2 + · · ·+ aijλj + ai(j+1)ej+1)ek | k ∈ Ti
}
and the origin.
The di-dimensional volume of the di-dimensional unit simplex scaled by λ in
each dimension is
λdi
(di)!
.
We are interested in the d-dimensional volume of Qd. If ai1 = ai2 = · · · = aid = 0
for some i, then this volume vanishes, and hence the mixed volume also vanishes.
In this case the kth column of the matrix M will be all zeroes for any k ∈ Ti, so
the permanent of M also vanishes, and the theorem holds. So assume that for each
i, there is some j with aij = 1. Then the volume of Qd is
N∏
i=1
(ai1λ1 + · · ·+ aidλd)
di
di!
.
Let (gjk) be the adjacency matrix of G, that is, gjk = 1 if there is an edge in G
from vj to vk and gjk = 0 otherwise. Then aij = gjk for all k ∈ Ti. So the volume
of Qd is ∏d
k=1 (g1kλ1 + · · ·+ gdkλd)∏N
i=1 di!
.
The mixed volume of P1, . . . , Pd is the coefficient of λ1λ2 · · ·λd in the above expres-
sion, which is the permanent of (gjk) divided by
∏N
i=1 di!.
It remains to show that the permanent ofM is the permanent of (gjk) divided by∏N
i=1 di!. Note that Mjk 6= 0 exactly when gjk 6= 0. We induct on N . For the base
case, d1 = d, and each nonzero entry of M is (1/d!)
1/d. A term in the permanent
of M is the product of d entries from M , so if it is nonzero it is 1/d!. Thus the
permanent of M is 1/d! times the permanent of (gjk), as required. Now partition
the matrix M and the matrix (gjk) into two vertical bands corresponding to the
subsets ∪N−1i=1 Ti and TN . The permanent can be computed as the sum of a term for
each choice of dN rows 1 ≤ j1 < · · · < jdN ≤ d: compute the (d − dN ) × (d − dN )
subpermanent of the left band obtained by crossing out those rows, compute the
dN×dN subpermanent of the right band corresponding to those rows, and multiply
them together. By the inductive hypothesis, the left subpermanent of M is the left
subpermanent of (gjk) divided by
∏N−1
i=1 di!. For the right subpermanent, every row
is either all nonzero or all zero. If any row is all zero, both right subpermanents
vanish. If every entry is nonzero, then all the entries are the same: gjk = 1 and
Mjk = (1/dN !)
1/dN . The right subpermanent of M is dN !
(
(1/dN !)
1/dN
)dN
= 1,
and the right subpermanent of (gjk) is dN !. So the whole term for M is the whole
term for (gjk) divided by
∏N
i=1 di!. 
We note that if the coefficients are generic subject to the conditions given in
Theorem 1, all the solutions to the system will lie in the torus (C∗)d. In what
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follows we will refer to “the number of solutions in the torus (C∗)d” as “the number
of solutions” by abuse of language.
Corollary 2. Convert the directed graph G of Theorem 1 into a bipartite graph on
2d vertices, with the source of every edge on the left side and the target of every
edge on the right side. If the system in Theorem 1 is 0-dimensional with generic
coefficients, then it has a solution if and only if this bipartite graph has a perfect
matching.
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 1, we see that the number of solutions is nonzero
if and only if the permanent of the adjacency matrix is nonzero. It is a well-known
fact that this is equivalent to the existence of a perfect matching: any permutation
pi which contributes a nonvanishing term
∏d
j=1 gjpi(j) to the permanent corresponds
to a perfect matching, where vertex j on the left is matched to vertex pi(j) on the
right. 
In fact, we could have used the bipartite graph in Theorem 1. However, we
defined the polynomial graph to be the directed graph to remain consistent with
the usual definition of graphical models of games.
Corollary 3. If the system in Theorem 1 is 0-dimensional and has a solution, then
every node in the graph G lies on a directed cycle.
Proof. As in the proof of the previous corollary, a permutation pi must exist such
that j has an edge to pi(j) for every j = 1, . . . , d. This permutation can be expressed
as a product of disjoint cycles. Each node lies in one of these cycles, and a cycle of
the permutation corresponds to a directed cycle in the graph. 
We should note carefully that the Bernstein-Kouchnirenko theorem gives the
number of solutions to a 0-dimensional polynomial system. So when the number
given by that theorem—in particular, the permanent of the matrix in Theorem
1—vanishes, either the polynomial system has no solution, or its solution set has
positive dimension.
Note that the conditions on G imply that the matrix M has a di × di block of
zeroes along its diagonal for i = 1, . . . , N . This is because G has no self-loops, and
if it had an edge from an element vj of Ti to any other element vk of Ti, then there
would have to be an edge from vj to every element of Ti including itself.
2. Finite Games
In the remainder of this article, we apply Theorem 1 to game theory in a few
different contexts. We now introduce the notation we will need from game theory.
The concepts we describe in this section can be found in a standard game theory
text such as [7]. However, in some cases we use simplified notation for the restricted
situations we will consider.
Game theory is the study of strategic interaction. Such interaction takes place
between multiple agents in a single setting, or environment. An agent is an entity
which can receive information about the state of the environment (including itself
and other agents), take actions which may alter that state, and express preferences
among the various possible states. These preferences are encoded for each agent by
a utility function, a mapping from the set of all states to R. Its value for a particular
state is the utility of that state for the agent. The agent prefers one state to another
POLYNOMIAL GRAPHS WITH APPLICATIONS TO GAME THEORY 5
if its utility is greater, and is indifferent between them if their utilities are equal.1
Changes in the state of the environment may also occur spontaneously (i.e., not
due to the actions of any of the agents). A strategy is a (possibly stochastic) rule
for an agent to choose an action at every point when the agent may act, given
the available information. A rational agent is one whose strategy maximizes its
expected utility under the circumstances.
We will restrict attention to games which take place in a finite number of time
steps between a finite number of agents, each of which has a finite number of
possible actions. The agents are called players, and whenever they take an action
they are said to move. A spontaneous change in the state of the environment is
called a move by nature. The game is over when no player (including nature) has
any possible actions. The state of the environment at such a terminal stage is
called an outcome. Generally preferences are specified only over outcomes, not at
intermediate stages of the game.
The first type of game we will consider is the normal-form game. In a normal-
form game, there is only one time step, at which all the players move simultaneously.
We denote the set of players by I = {1, . . . , N}. The actions a player can take are
called pure strategies. We associate to the players finite disjoint sets of pure strate-
gies S1, . . . , SN . For each i let di = |Si| − 1. We write the set Si as {si0, . . . , sidi}.
We write S =
∏
i∈I Si. Game play consists of the collective choice of an element of
S by the players: each player i moves by choosing an element of Si. We identify
S as the set of possible outcomes. We denote by ui(s) the utility for player i of
the outcome s ∈ S. Thus, the game is completely specified by the number N of
players, the sets Si of pure strategies, and the utility functions (or payoff functions)
ui : S 7→ R.
A player may move stochastically rather than deterministically. In that case
the player is said to execute a mixed strategy. The mixed strategy specifies the
probability with which the player chooses each possible action. The set Σi of mixed
strategies of player i is the set of all functions σi : Si 7→ [0, 1] with
∑
sij∈Si σi(sij) =
1. That is, it is the di-dimensional probability simplex. We write Σ =
∏
i∈I Σi. An
element σ of Σ, which specifies the strategies executed by all the players, is called
a strategy profile. If the players execute the strategy profile σ, then the probability
of outcome s is σ(s) =
∏N
i=1 σi(si). The expected utility for player i of the strategy
profile σ is given by multilinearity as ui(σ) =
∑
s∈S ui(s)σ(s).
When considering how agent i should behave, it will be convenient to separate out
i’s own strategy, over which i has control, from the strategies of all the other players.
We write Σ−i =
∏
j∈I−{i} Σj , and we write σ−i for the image of σ ∈ Σ under the
projection pi−i from Σ onto Σ−i. By abuse of notation, we write ui(τi, σ−i) for the
ith player’s expected payoff from the strategy σ whose ith component is τi and
whose other components are defined by pi−i(σ) = σ−i.
1Instead of specifying the utility of each state for each agent, one might specify the change
in utility, or marginal utility, which accrues to each agent upon each transition between states.
Clearly any utility function induces a marginal utility function, but unless one imposes additional
conditions a marginal utility function may not induce a utility function. Such a marginal utility
function, which one might call intransitive, could still be a useful model of reality. For example,
one wouldn’t necessarily feel the same about being laid off and then immediately rehired as if
one had simply continued in the same position. However, we will not consider such intransitive
marginal utility functions any further.
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We assume perfect information: each player knows the complete specification
of the game, knows that every player knows, knows that every player knows that
every player knows, ad infinitum. That is, the specification of the game is common
knowledge. Under these circumstances, what is rational behavior? In his landmark
paper [6], John Nash answered this question in terms of what is now called best
response. A best response of player i to the strategy profile σ is a mixed strategy
σ∗i such that ui(σ
∗
i , σ−i) ≥ ui(σ
′
i, σ−i) for any other mixed strategy σ
′
i of player i.
That is, given that all the other players execute the strategy profile σ−i, the mixed
strategy σ∗i maximizes player i’s expected utility. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy
profile which is a best response to itself for all the players. That is, it is a strategy
profile σ∗ such that for each player i, we have ui(σ∗) ≥ ui(σ′i, σ
∗
−i) for every other
mixed strategy σ′i of player i. Nash proved that such an equilibrium always exists.
How can we compute the Nash equilibria of a given game? We need to search the
set Σ of strategy profiles, which is a polytope: the product of probability simplices.
We can decompose the problem by stratifying this polytope: first we look for Nash
equilibria in its interior, then in the interiors of its facets, then in the interiors of
the facets of those facets, and so forth, until finally we look for Nash equilibria at
the vertices of the polytope (that is, pure strategy Nash equilibria). A strategy
profile σ lies in the interior of this polytope if σi(sij) > 0 for every sij ∈ Si, for
every i. Such a strategy profile is called totally mixed. Note that a totally mixed
Nash equilibrium need not exist.
So we concentrate our attention on the totally mixed Nash equilibria. We observe
that for a totally mixed strategy profile σ to be a Nash equilibrium, it is necessary
and sufficient that for each player i we have ui(sij , σ−i) = ui(sik, σ−i) for any pure
strategies sij , sik ∈ Σi. These equations are called the indifference equations for
player i. The sufficiency is clear. For the necessity, suppose to the contrary that
ui(sij , σ−i) > ui(sik, σ−i). Define σ′i by
σ′i(sil) =


σi(sij) + σi(sik), l = j
0, l = k
σi(sil), otherwise
.
Then since σi(sik) > 0, we have
ui(σ
′
i, σ−i) = ui(σ) + σi(sik) (ui(sij , σ−i)− ui(sik, σ−i)) > ui(σ),
a contradiction.
So we have a system of
∑N
i=1 di equations, ui(sij , σ−i) = ui(si0, σ−i) for j =
1, . . . , di, for i = 1, . . . , N , in
∑N
i=1 di unknowns σi(sij) for j = 1, . . . , di, for i =
1, . . . , N . (Here we have dehomogenized, that is, we have eliminated σi(si0) by sub-
stituting 1−
∑di
j=1 σi(sij)). What we are equating are the expressions ui(sij , σ−i) =∑
s−i∈S−i ui(sij , s−i)σ1(s1) · · ·σi−1(si−1)σi+1(si+1) · · ·σN (sN ), which are multilin-
ear polynomials whose coefficients are the real numbers ui(s). The (possibly com-
plex) roots of this system are called quasiequilibria, and those roots which are totally
mixed strategy profiles (that is, which are real with σi(sij) > 0 and
∑di
j=1 σi(sij) <
1) are the totally mixed Nash equilibria.
Now we see how Theorem 1 applies to normal-form games. In this case, each
Ti corresponds to the set of strategies of player i. The blocks of zeroes along the
diagonal imply that a player’s expected payoffs from their own pure strategies do
not depend on the probabilities they have assigned to their own pure strategies, so
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these polynomial systems do indeed correspond to the equations for totally mixed
Nash equilibria of games.
Corollary 4. Consider a normal form game between players I = {1, . . . , N} with
pure strategy sets Si for each i and generic utility functions ui :
∏
i∈I Si → R.
Construct a graph G with nodes
∐
i∈I(Si − {si0}) such that there is an edge from
sik to sjl in G if and only if i 6= j. Let the variable corresponding to sik be σi(sik)
and the equation corresponding to sik be the indifference equation ui(sik, σ−i) =
ui(si0, σ−i). Then this system of equations obeys the conditions of Theorem 1, so
the number of solutions in the generic case is given by that theorem.
This special case was proved as Theorem 2 in [5], so our Theorem 1 is a gener-
alization of that theorem.
3. Graphical Games
Kearns, Littman, and Singh [3] defined the concept of graphical games, or games
obeying graphical models. (That paper considers undirected graphs, but the ex-
tension to directed graphs which we will use is straightforward.) A game between
players 1, . . . , N obeys a directed graphical model, if the payoffs to player i1 only
depend on the actions of those players i2 6= i1 for which there is an edge from i1 to
i2 in the graphical model.
Our theorem applies in particular to graphical games. As in Corollary 4, we
take the pure strategy sets Si to be the sets Ti of Theorem 1. Given a polynomial
graph G as in Theorem 1, we draw an edge from i1 to i2 in the graphical model if
there is any j ∈ Ti1 with edges to the vertices in Ti2 in the polynomial graph G.
The polynomial graph G may not represent the most generic case of the graphical
model, however. If we are given a graphical model, then to construct its polynomial
graph G, for any edge from i1 to i2, we draw edges in G from every vertex j ∈ Ti1
to every vertex in Ti2 .
Corollary 5. Suppose a normal form game between players I = 1, . . . , N with pure
strategy sets Si for each i and utility functions ui :
∏
i∈I Si → R obeys a directed
graphical model γ with nodes 1, . . . , N . Construct a graph G with nodes
∐
i∈I Si
such that there is an edge from sik to sjl in G if and only if there is an edge from
i to j in γ. Then the system of equations defining the quasiequilibria of G satisfies
the hypotheses of Theorem 1, so the number of such quasiequilibria in the generic
case is given by the permanental formula.
For example, consider a game with 4 players, each with 3 pure strategies. Gener-
ically, such a game has
per
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quasiequilibria.
8 RUCHIRA S. DATTA
1 2
4 3
Figure 1. Graphical game
But suppose now that game obeys a graphical model as in Figure 3.1. The nodes
in the graphical model refer to the players, and the edges specify that the payoff
to the source player depends on the actions of the target player. For brevity, write
a = σ1(s11), b = σ2(s12), c = σ2(s21), d = σ2(s22), e = σ3(s31), f = σ3(s32),
g = σ4(s41), and h = σ4(s42). Since the payoff to player 1 depends only on the
actions of player 2, equating the payoff to player 1 from pure strategies s10 and s11
gives
u1(s10, s20, •)σ2(s20) + u1(s10, s21, •)σ2(s21) + u1(s10, s22, •)σ2(s22)
= u1(s11, s20, •)σ2(s20) + u1(s11, s21, •)σ2(s21) + u1(s11, s22, •)σ2(s22)
or
(u1(s11, s20, •)− u1(s10, s20, •)) (1− c− d)+
+ (u1(s11, s21, •)− u1(s10, s21, •)) c+ (u1(s11, s22, •)− u1(s10, s22, •)) d = 0.
Thus for player 1 we have two equations of the form
•c+ •d+ • = 0,
for player 2 we have two equations of the form
•e+ •f + • = 0,
for player 3 we have two equations of the form
•g + •h+ • = 0,
and for player 4 we have two equations of the form
•a+ •b+ • = 0.
Then the associated polynomial graph is depicted in Figure 3. The equation asso-
ciated with the node labelled 1a equates the payoffs to player 1 from choosing s11
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Figure 2. Associated polynomial graph for graphical game
(which 1 does with probability a) or choosing s10. The game has
per
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quasiequilibrium. Indeed, this will always be the case for a graphical model which
is a directed cycle, where each player has the same number of pure strategies. The
reason is that the indifference equations in this case are linear, as we saw in this
example.
The polynomial graph G as defined in Theorem 1 contains more refined informa-
tion than the graphical model. The partition into the Ti’s also can be more refined
than the partition of the set of all pure strategies into the sets of pure strategies
for each player. Next we will see an example of such a refinement when considering
the reduction of extensive-form games to normal-form, where actions correspond to
branches of the game tree.
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4. Extensive-Form Games
Now we consider finite horizon extensive-form games. (See for example [7], Chap-
ter 6.) Such a game takes place in a finite number of time steps, at each of which
only a single player (possibly nature) may move. (Which player moves, and what
actions the player is allowed to take, may depend on what moves were made previ-
ously.) Such a game is completely specified as follows. We specify a set of players
I = {1, . . . , N}, and we specify a game tree T : a finitely branching tree of finite
depth in which each non-leaf node is labelled by a number in 0, . . . , N , each leaf is
labelled by an N -tuple of real numbers, and each branch emanating from a (non-
leaf) node labelled 0 is assigned a positive real weight, so that the total weight
emanating from such a node is 1. (We consider the branches of this tree to be
directed away from the root.)
Game play proceeds as follows. Each node of the tree represents a state of
the environment. At each time step, if we are at a non-leaf node labelled by i in
1, . . . , N , then player i acts by choosing one of the branches emanating from that
node. Then the environment undergoes the transition to the node at the end of
that branch, and we advance to the next time step. If we are at a non-leaf node
labelled by 0, then the environment instead makes a random transition along one
of the branches emanating from that node; the probability of each branch is given
by its weight. If we are at a leaf node λ labelled by (u1(λ), . . . , uN(λ)), then the
game is over, and each player i accrues utility ui(λ). Thus, the leaf nodes are the
outcomes of the game.
Unless otherwise specified, we will assume perfect information. Not only do all
players have common knowledge of the specification of the game, but whenever a
player is about to move, that player knows what moves have been made by all the
other players (including nature) up to that point.
Every extensive-form game is equivalent to a normal-form game. For each node
ν of the game tree, we write E(ν) for the set of edges emanating from ν. Then the
set of pure strategies of player i is
Si =
∏
ν∈T
label(ν)=i
E(ν).
Given a pure strategy profile s ∈ S =
∏
i∈I Si, we can compute the probability of
each leaf node λ of the game tree. A unique path ν0ν1 . . . νm = λ leads from the
root ν0 of T to λ. Then Pr[λ|s] =
∏m−1
j=0 Pr[νj → νj+1|s], where
Pr[νj → νj+1|s] =


1, νj is labelled by i ∈ I and siνj = (νj → νj+1)
0, νj is labelled by i ∈ I and siνj 6= (νj → νj+1)
wt(νj → νj+1), νj is labelled by 0
and so the utility functions of the normal-form game are given by
ui(s) =
∑
λ∈T
λleaf
ui(λ) Pr[λ|s].
We note that the game specification implies certain equalities among the numbers
ui(s). If we consider the set of normal-form games with a fixed set of players I and
outcomes S to be a linear space with basis {ui(s) : s ∈ S}, then the extensive-form
games with the same set of players I and a fixed game tree having S as the set
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of outcomes lie in a linear subspace of this space, given by these equalities. Let A
be the set of non-leaf nodes of the tree which are not labelled by 0. Then we can
identify S with
∏
ν∈AE(ν). For any s ∈ S and ν ∈ A, we write sν = siν , where i is
the label of ν. Suppose ν ∈ A is an ancestor of µ ∈ A. Then ν has a unique child
α that is also an ancestor of µ (possibly µ itself). Let β be any other child of ν. If
s, s′ ∈ A with sν = (ν → β) and
s′ν =
{
e, ν = µ
sν , otherwise
for some edge e ∈ E(µ), then ui(s) = ui(s
′). This is because Pr[λ|s] = Pr[λ|s′] = 0
unless λ is a descendant of β or λ is not a descendant of ν, and in either case λ
cannot be a descendant of µ. In short, the node µ is never reached, so it doesn’t
matter which action is chosen there.
If different players act at ν and µ, then there is no way to eliminate this redun-
dancy, but when the same player i acts at ν and µ, we can do so. In this case we
replace all the pure strategies which are forced to be equal by a single pure strategy,
called a reduced pure strategy. See for example [7], p. 94.
We note that after iterated elimination of strictly dominated pure strategies, for
any node all of whose children are leaves, the payoffs to the player who acts at
that node must be equal at all these child leaves. If nature acts at such a node ν
whose children are leaves λ1, . . . , λk, then we can replace ν by a leaf with utilities
ui(ν) =
∑k
l=1wt(ν → λl)ui(λ) for each i ∈ I. So we assume nature never acts at
such nodes.
For extensive-form games, the equilibrium concept can be refined. Each subtree
of the game tree induces a new extensive-form game, called a subgame. Each pure
strategy of the original game induces a pure strategy of each subgame by restriction
to that subtree, and thus each strategy profile of the original game induces a strategy
profile of each subgame. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of an extensive-form game if it induces a Nash equilibrium of each subgame.
We can find a subgame perfect pure strategy Nash equilibrium by backwards
induction. We construct the pure strategy profile as follows. We perform iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Then at each node all of whose children
are leaves, we choose one leaf (recall that the payoffs of all leaves for the player who
acts at that node will be the same). We assign this branch to the corresponding
component of the pure strategy profile, replace this node by this leaf, and repeat
the procedure on the resulting subtree.
We begin our analysis of totally mixed Nash equilibria of extensive form games
by noting the following:
Theorem 6. All totally mixed Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are sub-
game perfect.
Proof. Let σ be a totally mixed Nash equilibrium of an extensive form game with
N players defined by game tree T . Note that the strategy profile induced by σ on
every subgame is also totally mixed. Let ν be a non-leaf node of T . Let σ˜ be the
strategy profile induced by σ in the subgame induced by ν. Let s˜j and t˜j be pure
strategies of player j in this subgame. Choose an action for j at each node µ that
is not a descendant of ν where j acts, such that if µ is an ancestor of ν then j
chooses the branch leading towards ν, and use this choice to extend s˜j and t˜j to
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pure strategies sj and tj of player j in the original game. (So, sj and tj specify the
same actions outside the subtree.) Let ν0 . . . νm = ν be the unique path from the
root ν0 of T to ν. We have uj(sj , σ−j) = uj(tj , σ−j). Let L be the set of all leaves
of T under ν and L′ be the set of all other leaves. Then
uj(sj , σ−j) =
∑
λ∈L uj(λ) Pr[λ|(sj , σ−j)] +
∑
λ∈L′ uj(λ) Pr[λ|(sj , σ−j)]
=
∑
λ∈L uj(λ) Pr[λ|(sj , σ−j)] +
∑
λ∈L′ uj(λ) Pr[λ|(tj , σ−j)]
since sj and tj choose the same actions outside the subtree. Thus
(1)
∑
λ∈L
uj(λ) Pr[λ|(sj , σ−j)] =
∑
λ∈L
uj(λ) Pr[λ|(tj , σ−j)].
Furthermore, for any λ ∈ L, we have
Pr[λ|(sj , σ−j)] = Pr[λ|(s˜j , σ˜−j)]
m−1∏
k=0
Pr[νk → νk+1|(sj , σ−j)]
= Pr[λ|(s˜j , σ˜−j)]
m−1∏
k=0
Pr[νk → νk+1|(tj , σ−j)].
Noting that the common factor
∏m−1
k=0 Pr[νk → νk+1|(tj , σ−j)] in equation (1) is
positive by our choice of sj , tj and because σ is totally mixed, we have that
uj(s˜j , σ˜−j) =
∑
λ∈L
uj(λ)Pr[λ|(s˜j , σ˜−j)]
=
∑
λ∈L
uj(λ)Pr[λ|(t˜j , σ˜−j)]
= uj(t˜j , σ˜−j).
Thus σ˜ is a (totally mixed) Nash equilibrium of the subgame induced by ν. 
In light of this observation, the divide-and-conquer approach to finding all Nash
equilibria of a normal form game can be modified in the spirit of backwards induc-
tion to finding all subgame perfect equilibria (including mixed ones) of an extensive
form game. Recall that in a normal form game, we would consider subproblems in
which one pure strategy of one player i was removed. Now we instead consider sub-
problems in which, for some edge ν → µ where i acts at ν, we delete that edge and
the entire subtree below µ. We compute the normal form for the game described by
this pruned tree and recursively find all its subgame perfect equilibria. Each such
equilibrium σ induces an equilibrium σ˜ in the subgame under ν in the pruned tree.
To check whether σ is an equilibrium of the original game, we recursively compute
all the equilibria of the subgame under µ (where i does not act), and check that for
each such equilibrium τ , we have ui(σ˜) ≥ ui(τ).
We saw during the above proof that for a totally mixed strategy profile σ, the
equations uj(sj , σ−j) = uj(tj , σ−j) for all pure strategies sj, tj of j imply the cor-
responding equations for each subtree. The converse implication also clearly holds.
We will now associate a polynomial graph to a system of equations for the
quasiequilibria of an extensive-form game, so that we can apply Theorem 1. For
each node in the game tree where a player acts, we will have a variable for every
edge emanating from that node except one distinguished edge. This is because the
sum of the probabilities of choosing each of those edges must be 1, so we eliminate
POLYNOMIAL GRAPHS WITH APPLICATIONS TO GAME THEORY 13
one variable. Thus, we compare the payoffs between choosing the distinguished
edge and choosing any other edge. The equations will be indifference equations for
subgames of the extensive-form game.
Theorem 7. The set of quasiequilibria of a generic extensive-form game is either
empty or has positive dimension.
Proof. Consider an extensive form game with players I = 1, . . . , N and game tree
T . Let A be the set of non-leaf nodes in T not labelled by 0. For each ν ∈ A, let
E(ν) be the set of edges emanating from ν. For each ν ∈ A, let i be the player
which acts at ν and pick an element eiν ∈ E(ν). Let d =
∑
ν∈A |E(ν) − 1| and
partition d as
∐
ν∈A (E(ν)− {eiν}). Define a directed graph G on a set of d vertices
⋃
ν∈A
{ne | e ∈ E(ν)− {eiν}}
as follows: there is an edge from ne with e ∈ E(ν)− {eiν} to ne′ with e
′ ∈ E(µ)−
{ejµ} if i 6= j, ν is an ancestor of µ, either e or eiν lies on the path from ν to µ, and
if i acts at some node κ between ν and µ, then the edge eiκ lies on the path from
ν to µ. We will define a system of equations equivalent to the equations defining
totally mixed Nash equilibria of the extensive form game and satisfying conditions
1 to 3 of Theorem 1. The polynomial graph G is acyclic, so Corollary 3 implies our
assertion.
First we must state what the equations are. Fix a node ν ∈ A and let i be the
player which acts at ν. Then |E(ν)| − 1 equations refer to the subgame induced by
this node. For each e ∈ E(ν), define the pure strategy sie of i in this subgame by
sie(ν) = e and sie(µ) = eiµ for any node µ below ν where i acts. Writing σ˜ for the
strategy profile induced by σ in the subgame under ν, the |E(ν)| − 1 equations are
the equations ui(se, σ˜−i) = ui(seiν , σ˜−i) for e ∈ E(ν) − {eiν}. In these equations
we eliminated σ(ejµ) for every µ below ν where i does not act, by substituting
1−
∑
e∈E˜(µ)−e{jµ} σj(e) for σj(ejµ).
These are some of the indifference equations for the subtree below ν, which as we
saw in the previous theorem are implied by the indifference equations for the whole
tree. We show by induction that these equations also imply all the indifference
equations for the subtree below ν. (Thus we will have the indifference equations
for every subtree, and hence the whole tree, i.e., the original game.) Firstly, i is
indifferent between all i’s pure strategies in the subgame below ν, because although
we fixed i’s pure strategies at nodes µ below ν where i acts to be eiµ, we also have
that i is indifferent between i’s pure strategies in the subgame below µ by the
induction hypothesis. Secondly, consider any other player j. Let µ1, . . . , µm be the
nodes below ν where j acts, such that j does not act at any node between ν and
µk for any k. Let s˜j , t˜j be pure strategies of j in the subgame below ν, and write
s˜jk, t˜jk for the respective induced pure strategies of j in the subgame below µk. So
s˜j = (s˜j1, . . . , s˜jm) and t˜j = (t˜j1, . . . , t˜jm). Write the set L of leaves below ν as
L = L0 ∪
⋃m
k=1 Lk, where L0 is the set of leaves λ such that j does not act between
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ν and λ and Lk is the set of leaves below µk for k = 1, . . . ,m. Then
uj(s˜j , σ˜−j) =
∑
λ∈L
uj(λ|s˜j , σ˜−j)
=
∑
λ∈L0
uj(λ|σ˜−j) +
m∑
k=1
∑
λ∈Lk
uj(λ|s˜jk, σ˜−j)
=
∑
λ∈L0
uj(λ|σ˜−j) +
m∑
k=1
∑
λ∈Lk
uj(λ|t˜jk, σ˜−j)
= uj(t˜j , σ˜−j)
since for each k,
∑
λ∈Lk uj(λ|s˜jk, σ˜−j) =
∑
λ∈Lk uj(λ|t˜jk, σ˜−j) by the induction
hypothesis.
We can already see that the set of solutions to these equations, if nonempty, is
positive-dimensional. If player i acts at the root ν, then for any edge e emerging
from ν, σi(e) does not appear in any of the equations.
All the monomials occurring in these equations are squarefree. For each leaf
λ under ν, let the path from ν to λ be ν = ν1 . . . νk = λ. Then for any player
j with pure strategy s˜j , we have Pr[λ|s˜j , σ˜−j ] =
∏k−1
l=1 Pr[νl → νl+1|s˜j , σ˜−j ], and
each nonconstant term in the product is σn(νl → νl+1) for some player n 6= j.
So for any edge e where n acts, the variable σn(e) occurs at most once in such a
product. In fact σn(e) occurs in such a product for at most one e ∈ E(νl). (That
is, if e, e′ ∈ E(νl) then σn(e) and σn(e′) do not both occur in this monomial. So
condition 2 of Theorem 1 holds.) When we eliminate σn(enνl), we replace it by an
affine expression, so this remains true. Thus condition 1 of Theorem 1 holds.
The equations corresponding to E(ν)−{eiν} concern only the subgame below ν,
so σj(µ→ κ) occurs in these equations only if ν is an ancestor of µ. Furthermore, if
i acts at κ below ν, then σi(e) does not occur for any edge e ∈ E(κ)−{eiκ}, since we
fix that i chooses eiκ. For the same reason σj(e) does not occur for e ∈ E(µ)−{ejµ}
for any µ that lies below κ but not below eiκ. Thus condition 3 holds. 
Our result does not contradict Harsanyi’s generic finiteness theorem [2], because
generically, iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies/backward induction
will lead to a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (and so indeed there will be no
totally mixed Nash equilibria). On the other hand, another way to look at our result
is that in every interesting extensive-form game—one which is not completely solved
by backward induction, giving a unique equilibrium—the set of totally mixed Nash
equilibria is also interesting; it has positive dimension.
In particular, if ν is a node all of whose children are leaves, the equations cor-
responding to ν will be equations between constants, stating that for the player i
who acts at ν, the utilities ui(λ) at all the leaves λ below ν must be equal. This is
true if iterated elimination of strictly dominated pure strategies has already been
performed on this game.
It is clear that the system of equations we obtained is not canonical, since we
have made arbitrary choices of the edges eiν and the subtrees below each possible
choice are different. Choosing a different system may make it easier to compute
the set of quasiequilibria.
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Figure 3. An Extensive Form Game
We now present an example where the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria is a
positive-dimensional semialgebraic variety. Consider the extensive form game spec-
ified in Figure 4. The polynomial graph associated with this game tree is depicted in
Figure 3.4. For brevity, we write for example σ1(C) for σ1(A→ C). The quasiequi-
libria obey a system of 4 equations as in Theorem 7. The equation associated with
the edge E → G equates the payoff to player 3 from choosing this edge with that
from choosing the edge E → F , i.e., u3(F ) = u3(G). No variables occur in this
equation, that is, it is an equation between constants. Similarly, the equation asso-
ciated with the edge E → H is u3(F ) = u3(H). The equation associated with the
edge C → E is u2(D) = u2(E), where we have written u2(E) for the expected pay-
off u2(E, σ−2) to player 2 for choosing the edge C → E, given the strategy profile of
the other players. In this case u2(E) = u2(F )σ3(F ) + u2(G)σ3(G) + u2(H)σ3(H),
so
u2(D) = u2(F ) + (u2(G) − u2(F ))σ3(G) + (u2(H)− u2(F ))σ3(H).
Finally, the equation associated to the edge A→ C is
u1(B) = u1(C)
= u1(D) (1− σ2(E)) + u1(F )σ2(E) (1− σ3(G) − σ3(H))
+u1(G)σ2(E)σ3(G) + u1(H)σ2(E)σ3(H).
16 RUCHIRA S. DATTA
A C
C E
E G E H
Figure 4. Associated Polynomial Graph For An Extensive Form Game
Looking at the specific payoffs in Figure 4, we see that the payoffs to player 3
for choosing F , G, or H are equal, as required. Equating the payoffs to player 2
for choosing D or E, we get 6σ3(H) = 2, or σ3(H) =
1
3 . This leaves σ3(G) free to
vary such that 0 < σ3(G) <
2
3 . Finally, we must equate the payoffs to player 1 for
choosing B or C. This gives
2(1− σ2(E)) + σ2(E) (σ3(G) + 1) =
3
2
or
σ2(E)(1 − σ3(G)) =
1
2
.
Thus the points σ3(G) and σ2(E) lie on a hyperbola. This hyperbola intersects
the interior of the product of simplices. For instance, the point σ3(G) =
5
12 (so
σ3(F ) =
1
4 ) and σ2(E) =
6
7 lies in this intersection. So the set of quasiequilibria is
a portion of a hyperbolic cylinder, the product of a segment of a hyperbola with a
line segment (since σ1(B) varies freely with 0 < σ1(B) < 1).
We can analyze this game a little further. Player 3 would like player 1 to some-
times choose B, but cannot force player 1 always to choose B, since if player 2
always chooses D then both player 1 and player 2 are better off with player 1
choosing C. The best player 3 can do is make the payoffs to player 1 from choosing
B and C equal. Now if player 3 made player 2 get a greater payoff from choosing D
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than E, then player 2 would always choose D, player 1 would always choose C, and
player 3 would get nothing. So player 3 must make u2(D) ≤ u2(E). We analyzed
the case u2(D) = u2(E) above. If player 3 makes σ3(H) >
1
3 , then u2(D) < u2(E)
and player 2 will always choose E. Then the payoff to player 1 from choosing C is
σ3(G)+3σ3(H). Thus we have σ3(G)+3σ3(H) =
3
2 with
1
3 < σ3(H) ≤
1
2 (this makes
0 ≤ σ3(G) <
1
2 and
1
6 < σ3(F ) ≤
1
2 ). Then σ1(C) varies freely with 0 ≤ σ1(C) ≤ 1,
so we have a rectangle of partially mixed equilibria. Player 3 is better off choosing
these, since then the outcome D where player 3 gets zero payoff is never reached.
Along the line σ3(G)+3σ3(H) =
3
2 , equilibria with greater σ3(H) Pareto dominate
those with smaller σ3(H), i.e., they make some player better off and no player worse
off. Specifically, the payoff to player 2 increases, the payoff to player 1 is always 32 ,
and the payoff to player 3 stays the same at 2(1 − σ1(C)) + σ1(C) = 2 − σ1(C).
Thus the Pareto dominant equilibrium among those on this line is that player 3 has
σ3(F ) =
1
2 , σ3(G) = 0, and σ3(H) =
1
2 . On the other hand, at the pure strategy
equilibrium where player 3 always chooses H , we have that player 1 always chooses
C, and the payoff to player 3 falls from 2 − σ1(C) to 1. Thus player 3 does not
prefer this equilibrium, and instead mixes F and H equally to have some chance
of a higher payoff. As σ1(C) increases, the payoff to player 3 decreases and the
payoff to player 2 increases, so the equilibria along this line do not Pareto dominate
each other. Thus without introducing other issues (such as risk-aversion) there is
no criterion for predicting which of the equilibria along the line 0 < σ1(C) < 1,
σ2(E) = 1, σ3(F ) = σ3(H) =
1
2 should be chosen.
5. Games With Emergent Node Tree Structure
So far we have been discussing normal form games with finite numbers of players,
each with a finite number of pure strategies. Such a game is defined by giving a set
of players I = {1, . . . ,N}, for each player i a finite set of pure strategies Si, and for
each pure strategy profile σ (element of the product S =
∏
i∈I Si) and each player
i the utility ui(σ) received by that player when that strategy profile is played. Now
we will introduce a particular kind of structure that a normal form game may have.
We now define an emergent node tree structure on a normal form game. This
is a new model for games in which the players can be hierarchically decomposed
into groups. Usually such hierarchical decomposition is discussed in the framework
of cooperative game theory. Instead, we define certain conditions on the payoff
functions in a noncooperative game such that a given hierarchical decomposition
“makes sense”, in a way that we will define precisely. At the end of this section we
briefly describe how our framework relates to that of cooperative game theory.
Definition. An emergent node tree structure on a normal form game with player
I = {1, . . . ,N}, pure strategy sets Si for i ∈ I, and utility functions ui :
∏
i∈I Si →
R to consist of:
• A tree T with N leaves. The leaves are in bijection with the players I =
{1, . . . ,N}. Write Cv for the set of children of a node v ∈ T , Bv for the set
of its siblings, and f(v) for its parent.
• For each non-leaf, non-root node v of the tree (which we call an emergent
player), a set Sv of pure strategies, with |Sv| ≤
∏
w∈Cv |Sw|.
• For each non-leaf, non-root node v, for each element sCv of the product
SCv =
∏
w∈Cv Sw of the pure strategies of its children and each element svk
of Sv, a number pv(k, sCv) signifying the probability that the (emergent)
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strategy of the emergent player v is svk when the strategies of its children
are given by sCv . So if v has K pure strategies, then
∑K
k=1 pv(k, sCv ) = 1.
If the children of v execute a mixed strategy, then the emergent mixed
strategy of v is given by multilinearity. Thus we have defined a linear map
from the strategy space of the children to the strategy space of the parent.
We require that this map have full rank.
• For each non-root node v (including the leaf nodes), real numbers γvw for
each non-root ancestor w of v and real numbers Uv(s) for each element
s ∈ Sv ×
∏
w∈Bv Sw. From these we define a utility function uv, which
is a sum of two terms: Uv(σv,Bv ), a multilinear function of the strategies
executed by v and its siblings in Bv, and
∑
nonroot ancestors u γvwuw. We
require that the utility function uv at a leaf node v be equal to the utility
function ui of the player i corresponding to the leaf node v.
We will refer to an emergent node tree structure as an ENT for short. Note that
for a given normal form game, we can always define a class of ENTs by defining
a tree with a single emergent node (the root node), so that all the leaf nodes are
siblings. We call such an ENT trivial. For any given normal form game, there need
be no nontrivial ENT, or there may be many distinct possible ENTs.
The behavior of the emergent players is completely determined by the behavior
of the actual players (the leaf nodes). The emergent strategy σv executed by the
emergent player v when the actual players execute strategy profile σ is defined
recursively by multilinearity:
σv(svk) =
∑
s∈SCv
pv(k, s)
∏
w∈Cv
σw(sw).
So we compute the emergent strategies from the bottom up.
From the above definition, we see that at a non-root node w of the tree, the
utility function is
uw(σ) = Uw(σw) +
∑
nonroot ancestor v
γwvuv(σ)
=
∑
s∈Sw×
Q
x∈Bw
Sx
Uw(s)σw(sw)
∏
x∈Bw
σx(sx) +
∑
nonroot ancestor v
γwvuv(σ).
So we compute the utility from the top down.
We see that the utilities of each actual player (the leaf nodes) may depend on
the strategies executed by every other actual player. So, the graphical model of
the actual game may be the complete graph. Imposing an emergent node tree
structure, corresponds to deleting some of these edges and adding more nodes, and
edges connected to those nodes, to the graph, so that the new graph has a nontrivial
structure. With the addition of the new variables σv(svk), we get more information
about the sparsity of our multilinear equations.
In our definition, we did not require that the numbers γvw have the same sign
for all descendants v of a node w. Thus, our definition does not require that
the emergence of a node represent a common interest among its descendant nodes
(although of course it does cover that situation).
For example, consider a normal form game with the ENT in Figure 5 where the
leaf nodes correspond to
(1) An American citizen
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7
World
5
America
6
Soviet Union
1
American citizen
2
Soviet saboteur
3
Soviet citizen
4
American saboteur
Figure 5. Emergent Node Structure For The Saboteur Game
(2) A Soviet saboteur living in America
(3) A Soviet citizen
(4) An American saboteur living in the USSR
The parent of nodes 1 and 2 is node 5, corresponding to America, the parent of
nodes 3 and 4 is node 6, corresponding to the USSR, and the the root is node 7,
corresponding to the world. Then while γ15 > 0 and γ36 > 0, we have γ25 < 0 and
γ46 < 0.
We now define a natural refinement of the equilibrium concept for games with
an ENTs.
Definition. If a normal form game has an ENT as defined above, then a Nash
equilibrium σ of that game is hierarchically perfect with respect to this ENT if for
every emergent node v, given the strategies induced on the siblings of v by σ, the
payoff u(v) at v cannot be increased by changing only σ(v).
Note that since our definition requires the linear map from the strategy space
of the children of v to the strategy space of v to be full-rank, any strategy σ′(v)
deviating from σ(v) which could result in a higher payoff u(v) would be achievable
by some strategy profile of the descendants of v.
We will also need the following definition:
Definition. A strategy profile of a normal form game with an ENT is totally
mixed with respect to this ENT if it is totally mixed in the usual sense and the
emergent strategies at each emergent node are also totally mixed.
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Theorem 8. For a generic game with an ENT as above, construct a directed
graphical model G whose nodes are the nodes of the tree except the root, with edges
as follows: the children in T of a node v form a directed clique in G, and each such
child also has a directed edge from v and each ancestor of v except the root, and from
each of their siblings. Then the Bernstein number we obtain by applying Theorem
5 to this directed graphical model is an upper bound on the number of totally mixed
Nash equilibria of this game which are hierarchically perfect and totally mixed with
respect to this ENT.
Proof. This is the graphical model we would obtain if all the emergent players were
actual players. That is, we have ignored the equations
σv(svk) =
∑
s∈SCv
pv(k, s)
∏
w∈Cv
σw(sw).
So the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of our game which are hierarchically
perfect with respect to this ENT is a subset of the set of totally mixed Nash
equilibria of the game with this graphical model. 
Generically, there may be no hierarchically perfect totally mixed Nash equilibria.
If the system of equations defining the quasiequilibria of the game with the directed
graphical model is 0-dimensional, then none of the finitely many solutions to this
system may satisfy the additional equations
σv(svk) =
∑
s∈SCv
pv(k, s)
∏
w∈Cv
σw(sw).
For example, consider a game as in Figure 5 in which each actual player has two
pure strategies and each emergent player also has two pure strategies. Generically,
a game with 4 players, each with 2 pure strategies, would have
per


0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0

 = 9
quasiequilibria. On the other hand, if the game has an ENT as in Figure 5, then
the directed graphical model given by the theorem is as in Figure 5. Thus there is
no more than
per


0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0


= 1
quasiequilibrium which is hierarchically perfect and totally mixed with respect to
this ENT. Indeed this would hold whenever the ENT is a binary tree, that is,
each non-leaf node has two children, and all siblings have the same number of pure
strategies.
For example, say that if players 1 and 2 either both choose their 0th pure strategy
or both choose their 1st pure strategy, then the emergent strategy of node 5 is s51,
otherwise it is s50. Similarly, if players 3 and 4 either both choose their 0th pure
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Figure 6. Graphical Model For The Saboteur Game
strategy or both choose their 1st pure strategy, then the emergent strategy of node
6 is s61, otherwise it is s60. Let U5 and U6 be given by
(2)
( s60 s61
s50 0, 0 0,−1
s51 7, 0 −5, 1
)
,
(where the (i, j)th entry is the pair U5(s5i, s6j), U6(s5i, s6j)). Let γ1 = γ3 = 1 and
γ2 = γ4 = −1. Let U1 and U2 be given by
(3)
( s20 s21
s10 0, 0 0,−1
s11 1, 0 −4, 1
)
,
and let U3 and U4 be given by
(4)
( s40 s41
s30 0, 0 0,−1
s31 1, 0 −3, 2
)
.
We abbreviate σi(si1) as σi by abuse of notation. At a totally mixed Nash equilib-
rium σ which is hierarchically perfect and totally mixed with respect to the ENT
of Figure 5, we have 0 = U5(s50, σ6) = U5(s51, σ6) = 7(1− σ6)− 5σ6 = 7− 12σ6, so
σ6 =
7
12 . Similarly we have 0 = −(1− σ5) + σ5 = 2σ5 − 1 so σ5 =
1
2 .
We also have u1(s10, σ2, σ5, σ6) = U1(s10, σ2)+u5(σ5, σ6), which we must equate
to u1(s11, σ2, σ5, σ6) = U1(s11, σ2) + u5(σ5, σ6), for hierarchical perfection (here
we are ignoring the fact that σ5 is a function of σ1 and σ2). This gives us that
0 = U1(s10, σ2) = U1(s11, σ2) = (1 − σ2) − 4σ2 = 1 − 5σ2, so σ2 =
1
5 . Similarly
we have u2(s20, σ1, σ5, σ6) = U2(s20, σ1) − u5(σ5, σ6), which we must equate to
u2(s21, σ1, σ5, σ6) = U2(s21, σ1)−u5(σ5, σ6), so U2(s20, σ1) = U2(s21, σ1). This gives
0 = −(1−σ1)+σ1 = 2σ1−1, so σ1 =
1
2 . We also have 0 = (1−σ4)−3σ4 = 1−4σ4,
so σ4 =
1
4 , and 0 = −(1− σ3) + 2σ3 = 3σ3 − 1, so σ3 =
1
3 .
Finally, we check that σ1σ2 + (1 − σ1)(1 − σ2) =
1
10 +
4
10 =
1
2 = σ5, and
σ3σ4+(1−σ3)(1−σ4) =
1
12+
6
12 =
7
12 = σ6. Now given σ−1, player 1 cannot increase
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either U1 or u5 by changing only σ1, so player 1 cannot increase u1. Similarly, player
2 can neither increase U1 nor decrease u5 by changing only σ2, so player 2 cannot
increase u2. In this way, we see that σ is a Nash equilibrium of the actual game.
A strategy profile of the actual players is a point in the product of probability
simplices corresponding to their actual strategy spaces. When we pass to an emer-
gent player one level up, we project the product of simplices for the actual players
below that emergent player to a smaller dimensional simplex, the space of emergent
mixed strategies of this emergent player. That we are able to do this means that
the payoffs to other actual players, not below this emergent player, depend only on
the choice of a point in the smaller dimensional simplex by these actual players.
We can use ENTs to analyze certain cooperative games. We consider each coali-
tion to be an emergent player. An actual player’s pure strategies specify the highest
level of coalition to join. So the number of its pure strategies is the number of its
ancestors in the tree(including itself). Each coalition forms if all its descendants
agree to join it, otherwise it doesn’t form. The number of pure strategies of a
coalition is one more than the number of its ancestors (including itself). Its pure
strategies correspond either to the highest level of coalition containing this coali-
tion which its members have agreed to form, or to not forming this coalition itself.
The function Uv for each coalition v is zero if the coalition forms and is equal to
the value of the coalition if it does form; it does not depend on the actions of v’s
siblings. The number γvw represents v’s share of the gain from the larger coalition
w, if it forms.
Note that a given ENT does not allow all possible subsets of players to form
coalitions, but only certain ones. We could extend the definition to all possible
subsets by positing that for any partition of a coalition into subcoalitions not in
the tree, the subcoalitions receives the same utility by joining or not joining the
coalition. Thus not all cooperative games correspond to ENTs. Those that do,
however, may often occur in modeling real situations.
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